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Abstract
Using the directional distance function we study a cross section of 110 coun-
tries to examine the efficiency of management of the tradeoffs between pollution
and income. The DEA model is reformulated to permit ’reverse disposability’ of
the bad output. Further, we interpret the optimal solution of the multiplier form
of the DEA model as an iso-inefficiency line. This permits us to measure the
shadow cost of the bad output for a country that is in the interior, rather than on
the frontier of the production possibilities set. We also compare the relative en-
vironmental performance of countries in terms of emission intensity adjusted for
technical efficiency. Only 10
Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis, directional distance function, pollution-
income tradeoff, shadow price.
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EFFICIENCY IN MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
OPPORTUNITY COST OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT 
 
 In recent years, a lot of attention has been devoted to the importance of improving 
global environmental quality and restraining the process of global warming. While most 
share a concern regarding the ecological impact of global warming and its economic 
consequences, there is at the same time awareness and concern regarding the economic 
costs that an effort to improve environmental quality might entail for different countries. 
In 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) represented for the first 
time a voluntary commitment from nations (Annex I countries i.e., industrialized 
countries) to curb global warming. This was followed by the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, a 
key aspect of which was to stipulate that the Annex I countries will reduce the emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5% of their respective 1990 levels by 2008-2012, thereby 
assigning  “common but differentiated responsibility” for each country. 
 In a recent study, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) contend that the Kyoto Protocol is 
not properly grounded in economics or environmental policy. They consider several 
alternative policy approaches and through comprehensive analysis they conclude that 
although in the early years the overall abatement level under the Kyoto Protocol is close 
to that under an ‘optimal program’ that they suggest, in the long run the emissions are 
actually higher under the Protocol approach than under their ‘optimal program’. They 
attribute this to two major shortcomings with the Kyoto Protocol approach: (i) Since each 
country’s emission limit is based on historical levels, it gives a major windfall to 
countries which historically had inefficient energy systems; and (ii) The Protocol limits 
the emissions for only a group of  countries but does not do so for the non-Annex I 
countries. This omission is significant since many of the developing countries will 
experience more rapid increases in emissions and will likely account for the major 
contributions to global emissions in the future as compared to the industrialized 
countries. 
 While cross-country comparison is not relevant for achieving the goals set by the 
Kyoto Protocol, we believe that efficient management of the tradeoffs between pollution 
and income requires each country to learn from the best practices of other countries 
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around the world. In this paper we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to carry out a 
comprehensive study of a cross section of 110 countries and construct a best practice 
‘meta’ frontier. Each country is then compared to this best practice frontier to estimate its 
efficiency in achieving the optimal balance between pollution reduction and growth in 
income.  
 In the existing literature, cross country studies on emissions have followed three 
main streams. One stream focuses on the relationship between emissions and per capita 
GDP following the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) theory, after Kuznets (1955).1 
Schurr et al. (1960) proposed that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between 
energy use and economic output in the U.S. A large body of literature has been devoted 
to investigating this topic ever since. The studies in this area address two main questions 
– (i) is there an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and emissions? (ii) if so, 
what is the income level at which the turning point occurs? In general, researchers have 
found that the inverted U-shaped curve exists for local pollutants (SO2, NOx, and CO) but 
most studies have not found this in case of global pollutants such as CO2. This is because 
local pollutants have a direct impact on the population and have, therefore, been 
regulated. Further, the income elasticity of environmental demand is generally higher in 
case of local pollutants. Even in cases when the EKC holds, the literature does not 
provide a consensus view as to the turning point. (see Borghesi, 1999 for a survey of this 
literature and criticisms of the EKC theory).   
 Another group of studies have undertaken an index decomposition approach to 
identify the contribution of explanatory factors beside growth in economic output, such 
as changes in fuel consumption, share of fossil fuels in energy use, aggregated energy 
intensity, sectoral fuel share, fuel emission factors, sectoral energy intensity, population 
and so on, to the changes in emissions over time for each country.  Recent studies that 
have employed this approach in cross-country comparisons include Ang and Zhang 
(1999), Greening et al. (1998), Luukkanen and Kaivo-oja (2000), Schipper et al. (1997), 
and Sun and Malaska (1998).  
  
                                                          
1
 Kuznets (1955) was the first to observe an inverted U-shape relationship between income inequality and a 
country’s aggregate income. 
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 While the EKC literature explores the relationship between changes in the levels 
of pollution concomitant with the growth in GDP, the index decomposition literature 
focuses on the sources of pollution intensity. A third stream attempts to account for the 
good output (GDP) as well as the bad output (pollution), along with resource utilization 
within the analytical framework. Production of the desirable output (GDP) in an economy 
leads to the production of the undesirable output (emissions). In general, a nation’s 
pollution abatement efforts entail economic costs by limiting economic growth, and also 
by diverting investment from productive purposes to abatement purposes.2 On the other 
hand there are benefits from such efforts in terms of reduced damages from pollution.  
Papers in this strand of the literature have utilized the directional distance function 
approach developed by Chambers et al. (1996). Chung et al. (1997) construct a 
Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index to isolate the contributions of technical change 
and technical efficiency change to productivity growth in the Swedish paper and pulp 
mills which generate both good and bad outputs.3 Färe et al. (2001) and Weber and 
Domazlicky (2001) employ the Malmquist-Luenberger index to analyze the 
manufacturing productivity growth across the states of the U.S., taking into account the 
emissions that are produced in the process. In an interstate analysis of U.S. agriculture, 
Färe et al. (2006) use directional distance functions to derive estimates of production 
inefficiency and shadow prices for polluting outputs. A few papers have used the 
Malmquist-Luenberger approach in the context of a global cross-country analysis. Jeon 
and Sickles (2004) analyze productivity growth in OECD and Asian countries over the 
period 1980 to 1990, taking into account the production of both GDP and CO2 emissions. 
Kumar (2006) examines environmentally sensitive total factor productivity growth in 41 
developed and developing countries over the period 1971 to 1992 accounting for both 
GDP and CO2 emissions.     
 Our study extends the existing literature in several ways, both methodological and 
empirical. First, we reformulate the DEA model to permit what we call the ‘reverse 
disposability’ of the bad output. Second, we interpret the optimal solution of the dual or 
                                                          
2
 Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that environmental protection, properly pursued, can be achieved 
without any economic costs. Their viewpoint, however, has been strongly criticized (see Palmer et al., 
1995). 
3
 In an earlier paper Färe et al. (1989) apply graph hyperbolic distance function to obtain efficiency 
measures for US paper mills in the presence of undesirable outputs. 
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multiplier form of the relevant DEA model as an iso-inefficiency line. This permits us to 
measure the shadow cost of the bad output for a country that is in the interior, rather than 
on the frontier of the production possibilities set. In our empirical application, we analyze 
a bigger dataset of 110 countries as compared to most studies in the literature that focus 
mainly on cross-country comparison of OECD countries. This extended coverage is of 
special significance in light of the growing importance of countries like India, Brazil, and 
China in the world economic scene. Apart from obtaining measures of technical 
efficiency for each country we compute and compare the opportunity cost of pollution 
reduction in the form of lost GDP, both for a 1% reduction in each country’s pollution as 
well as for a common target reduction in the absolute amount of pollution equal to 1% of 
the pollution in the U.S. We also compare the relative environmental performance of 
countries in terms of emission intensity adjusted for technical efficiency. 
 Our empirical analysis shows that only 10% of the countries in the sample are on 
the frontier. Also, there is considerable inter-country variation in the imputed opportunity 
cost of either a 1% decrease from their actual CO2 emission levels or of a target reduction 
of a specific absolute amount of CO2 reduction. We also find that differences in technical 
efficiency contribute to a large extent to differences in the observed levels of CO2 
intensity.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
methodological background for the nonparametric analysis. Section 3 develops the DEA 
models for measuring the directional distance function and the Nerlove-Luenberger 
measure of technical efficiency. Section 4 presents the findings from the empirical 
application and section 5 is the conclusion. 
    
2. The Production Technology  
Consider an m-output, n-input technology defined by the production possibility set 
T = {(x, y ): y can be produced from x}                                                                 (1) 
Assume further that the output bundle can be partitioned as y = (g, b), where g is the sub-
vector of good or desirable outputs while b is the sub-vector of bad or undesirable 
outputs. Following the convention in the literature, we assume that all inputs are freely 
disposable and that the production possibility set is convex. 
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Further, the good outputs are freely disposable. However, the bad outputs are not freely 
disposable although they are weakly disposable together with the good outputs. These 
assumptions can be formally stated as follows. 
(A1) If (x0, g,b) ∈ T  and x1≥ x0,  then  (x1, g,b) ∈ T. 
(A2) If (x0, g0,b0) ∈ T and (x1, g1,b1) ∈ T, then (λx0+(1-λ)x1,λ g0+(1-λ)g1,λb0+(1-λ)b1) ∈ T  
for all 0 ≤ λ  ≤ 1 
(A3). If (x, g0,b) ∈ T  and g1 ≤  g0,  then  (x, g1,b) ∈ T. This implies that the good output 
is strongly disposable. 
(A4). If (x, g0,b0) ∈ T,  then (x, kg0,kb0) ∈ T, for all  0 ≤ k ≤ 1. Thus the two outputs are 
together weakly disposable. Note that the bad output is not strongly disposable. 
A new assumption that we make in this paper is: 
(A5) If (x, g, b0) ∈ T and b1 ≥  b0,  then  (x, g, b1) ∈ T. This may be characterized as 
“reverse disposability” of the bad output.    
 This assumption of ‘reverse disposability’ of the bad output is essentially similar 
to the assumption of free disposability of the good output. After all, if a lower level of the 
desirable output could be associated with the same level of the bad output, a higher level 
of the bad output could also be generated along side the same level of the good output. 
Suppose that the good output is mega-watts of electricity generated and the bad output is 
pollutants emitted into the atmosphere. If a firm manages its pollution control device 
poorly, it is possible that the pollution level goes up without any increase in power 
generated.  
 Under assumptions (A1-A5), the production possibility set constructed from a 
sample of observed input output bundles (xj, gj, bj) (j=1,2,….,N) will be: 
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For a 1-input, 2-output (1 good and one bad) example, consider the following production 
possibility set  
             .≤:),;(
2






= x
b
gbgxT                                                                                    (3) 
Then, for x equal to 3, we have the output set 
P(x=3) ={ }bgbg 3:),( 2 ≤ .                                                                              (3a) 
It is easy to verify that for this example, whenever any (g, b)∈P(x=3), (kg, kb) ∈ P(x=3) 
for any k ∈ (0,1).  
Further the good and bad outputs are “null joint” in the sense that b can be reduced to 
zero only if g is also zero. This assumption of reverse disposability of the bad output 
clearly holds for the example shown above. 
 
3. The Directional Distance Function and Nerlove-Luenberger Efficiency 
Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996) introduced the directional distance function based on 
Luenberger’s (1992) benefit function to obtain a measure of technical efficiency based on 
the potential for increasing outputs while reducing inputs simultaneously. Consider some 
input-output bundle ),( 00 yx and a reference input-output bundle ).,( yx zz  Then, with 
reference to the production possibility set, T, the directional distance function can be 
defined as: 
 =),;,( 00 yx zzyxDr max .),(: 00 Tzyzx yx ∈++ βββ                                          (4) 
Clearly, the directional distance function evaluated at any specific input-output bundle 
will depend on ),( yx zz as well as on the reference technology. The arbitrarily chosen 
bundle ),( yx zz defines the direction along which the observed bundle, if it is an interior 
point, is projected on to the efficient frontier of the production possibility set.  In the 
present context, y0 = (g0, b0).  Suppose that we choose zx to be the null vector while zy = 
(g0, -b0). Then the Directional distance function is 
 =),;,,( 000 yx zzbgxD
r
max .))1(,)1(;(: 000 Tbgx ∈−+ βββ                             (5) 
Alternatively, 
 =),;,,( 000 yx zzbgxD
r
max ).())1(,)1((: 000 xPbg ∈−+ βββ                           (5a) 
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The relevant DEA LP problem is 
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Defining the weights µj = kλj we may rewrite this problem as 
      max  β  
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If we assumed constant returns to scale, the requirement that the λjs add up to unity 
would be dropped. In that case, beyond non-negativity there would be no further 
restrictions on the µjs. As a result, the variable k could be dropped and the input 
constraints could be replaced by 
            .
0
1
xx
N
j
j ≤∑µ  
The relevant CRS DEA problem would be 
              max  β  
s.t.         0
1
0 ggg
N
jj −≤−∑µβ ;                                                                                       (8) 
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The dual of this LP problem is 
              min  w′x0 + pb b0 – pgg0 
s.t.          w′xj + pb bj – pggj ≥ 0; (j= 1,2,…,N)                                                                   (9) 
               pgg0 + pb b0 = 1; 
              w≥ 0; pg, pb ≥ 0. 
Note that the objective function of this dual problem has a simple interpretation. It is the 
excess of the total cost consisting of the shadow cost of the inputs and also the shadow 
cost of the undesired output over the shadow value of the desirable output. By 
construction, it has a lower bound of zero. That value is realized only when the optimal 
value of β in the primal problem is zero. In that case, the actual bundle (g0, b0) lies on the 
boundary of P(x0). Of particular interest is the relative price of the bad output 
             ,
*
*
g
b
b p
p
=ρ                                                                                                           (10) 
where ),( ** bg pp is the vector of the optimal values of the shadow prices of the good and 
the bad output. It shows the required increase in the quantity of the good output that 
would exactly neutralize the detrimental effect of a marginal increase in the quantity of 
the bad output without changing the efficiency of the firm. Alternatively, it is the 
opportunity cost of a marginal decrease in the bad output measured by the allowable 
decrease in the good output. 
 
4. The Empirical Application 
 In this paper we analyze cross section data pertaining to 110 countries from the 
World Resources 2005 data book. The model includes one good output (GDP) and one 
bad output (CO2), along with two inputs: fossil fuels (FF) and non-fossil fuels (NFF) 
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consumed. All inputs and output quantities are measured per capita.4 GDP per capita is in 
purchasing power parity adjusted 2002 international dollars5. Carbon dioxide emission 
(CO2) is measured in metric tons of emission per person in 20006. Both fossil fuels (FF) 
and non-fossil fuels (NFF) are measured in kilograms of oil equivalent consumed per 
person in 20017. The summary statistics of the data are reported in Table 1. Not 
surprisingly, the country with the lowest per capita GDP, Tanzania, is one of the four 
countries with the lowest level of CO2 emission. The other three countries tied with 
Tanzania at the minimum level of CO2 emission are Congo Democratic Republic, 
Mozambique, and Nepal, ranked respectively, at 2nd, 9th, and 10th from the bottom in 
terms of per capita GDP. At the other extreme, Kuwait has the maximum level of CO2 
emission per capita. The lowest and the highest levels of fossil fuels consumption per 
capita are found in Congo Democratic Republic and Singapore, respectively.  Three 
Middle Eastern countries, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, reported zero consumption 
of non-fossil fuels. At the other end, Iceland had a level of non-fossil fuel consumption 
that was about 17 times the average per capita consumption across all countries in this 
data set.  In fact, the share of fossil fuels in total energy consumption was 27.1% in 
Iceland compared to 79.5% for the World as a whole. 
 Table 2 reports the CO2 intensity (in metric tons per $ GDP), which is a 
commonly used measure of the efficiency with which a country produces its GDP in an 
environmentally friendly manner. The energy intensity as well as the fossil fuel intensity 
(both measured in kgoe per $ GDP) are also reported for each country. As is to be 
expected, the correlation between CO2 intensity and fossil fuel intensity is much higher 
(0.9702) than the correlation coefficient between CO2 intensity and overall energy 
intensity (0.6594). The average CO2 intensity for our sample was 0.000502 but ranged 
from a high of 0.00295 for Uzbekistan to a low of 0.0000724 for Nepal. The average CO2 
intensity for the Annex I countries in our sample was 0.000287, whereas for the non-
Annex I countries it was 0.000444.                                                    
                                                          
4
 Measuring the outputs and inputs per capita obviates the need for including labor as an additional input. 
Further, we assume that the level of energy use is proportional to the use of capital. This permits us to 
exclude capital as a separate input from the model. 
5
 For an explanation of data construction see page 190 of World Resources 2005. 
6
 See page 206 of World Resources 2005. 
7
 See page 202 of World Resources 2005. 
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            The main results from the DEA models are also shown in Table 2. The column 
*β  lists the optimal values of the output-oriented directional distance function showing 
the proportion by which the good output (GDP per capita) could be expanded while at the 
same time the bad output (CO2 emission per capita) be reduced for the individual 
countries in the sample. It takes the value 0 for 11 countries (namely, Paraguay, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Algeria, Nepal, Morocco, Bangladesh, Ireland, Costa Rica, Oman, 
Mozambique, and Cameroon). All of these countries are operating at full efficiency in the 
sense that it is not possible to increase GDP per capita and reduce pollution at the same 
time. Ireland is the only country from the developed world that makes this list. Among 
the rest, Oman is an oil exporting country from the Middle East and the others are all 
developing economies with moderate to low GDP per capita. Compared with the U.S. 
(ranked at the 72nd position in the overall list), Ireland has a somewhat higher GDP and a 
substantially lower rate of CO2 emission (only 55% of the emission rate of the U.S.), per 
capita. The case of Oman is also interesting in that it is found to be efficient even though 
its entire energy consumption comes from fossil fuels. By contrast, Saudi Arabia also 
uses only fossil fuels but it has a lower per capita GDP and nearly one-third higher CO2 
emissions than Oman. The value of *β shows that it should be possible for Saudi Arabia 
to simultaneously reduce emissions and increase per capita GDP by about 13%. Most of 
the countries in the efficient list are low on overall energy intensity of GDP (Bangladesh, 
Morocco, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Ireland) or  fossil fuel intensity of GDP (Congo 
Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nepal, Cameroon, Costa Rica, and Bangladesh).    
 Out of the 110 countries in the sample, 70 have optimal values of *β  in excess of 
0.33. This implies that it should be possible for each of these countries to simultaneously 
increase per capita GDP and lower CO2 emissions by at least 33%. In fact, *β  exceeds 
50% for 48 countries. Surprisingly, India and China with lower values of *β  are more 
efficient than New Zealand, Belgium, and Finland. Among the developed nations of the 
West, Canada performs the worst with a value of *β as high as 0.66. In fact, the U.S. 
barely outperforms countries like Pakistan and India. Not surprisingly, the worst five 
performers (Bulgaria, Tajikistan, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine) are all 
from the former Soviet Bloc. 
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 For the 99 countries with the values of *β greater than zero, there is no immediate 
trade off between pollution reduction and producing higher output. For each of these 
countries, there is room to increase GDP and reduce CO2 emissions simultaneously.8  
Consider the case of Japan for a specific example. The value of *β (from problem (8) 
above) for Japan was 0.3192. This implies that it should be possible to increase per capita 
GDP and, at the same time, reduce CO2 emissions by 31.92 per cent. This amounts to an 
increase in GDP per capita by 8598.29 dollars and a decrease in CO2 emissions per capita 
by 3.06432 tons without any increase in the inputs. Once such potential increase in GDP 
and decrease in pollution have been achieved, any further decrease in pollution without 
increase in the inputs would require a decrease in GDP. 
 The columns pg and pb show the shadow prices of the good output (per capita 
GDP) and the bad output (per capita CO2 emissions), respectively. The relative shadow 
price of CO2 emissions is shown in the column rpb. Because actual per capita GDP is 
expressed in international dollars, rpb is an opportunity cost of a marginal decrease in 
emissions per capita expressed in dollars. These shadow prices and the implied 
opportunity cost of pollution abatement in the form of GDP reduction are really 
applicable only at the optimal projection of the actual outputs (good and bad) on to the 
frontier of the production possibility set. It should be recognized, however, that 
eliminating technical inefficiencies could involve major adjustment costs and may be 
difficult to achieve in the short run. Thus, the optimal projection serves more as a 
benchmark for improvement than as an achievable goal in the short term. Even when a 
country is inefficient and the observed output bundle lies in the interior of the output set 
of its observed input bundle, at the existing level of (in)efficiency, the relative shadow 
price does provide a measure of the opportunity cost of a marginal reduction in pollution. 
Note that by standard duality results relating the optimal solutions of the primal and dual 
LP problems (8) and (9), 
*
0
*
bb p=∂
∂β
 and .*
0
*
gg p−=∂
∂β
                                                                                     (11) 
                                                          
8
 Based on several case studies, Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that companies may be able to 
reduce pollution and at the same time increase their competitiveness by removing resource inefficiencies 
and realizing potential technological improvements. Our findings at the country level also suggests that 
most countries in our sample could experience a reduction in pollution along with increase in GDP to a 
certain extent before facing a tradeoff between the two goals.  
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With *β  and x0 held constant, 
 .00
*
0
*
00 0
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                                                               (12) 
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 .00 *
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=                                                                                                       (13) 
This last expression defines the minimum reduction in the good output that would be 
required in order to reduce the bad output by a small amount db0, unless there is an 
improvement in technical efficiency. In this sense, it is the opportunity cost of lowering 
the bad output by db0. 
 We now look at the individual shadow prices of GDP and CO2 emissions and also 
the relative shadow prices of CO2 for the different countries in our sample reported in 
Table 2. The shadow price of GDP (pg) was positive for each and every observation in 
the data. However, the shadow price, pb (and hence the relative price, rpb) of CO2 was 
zero for 7 of the 110 countries. Five of these 7 countries were on the frontier with the 
value of *β equal to 0. For every country j that was efficient, the optimal solution of the 
primal problem (8) had *β equal to 0 and the corresponding *jλ  equal to 1 with all other 
variables taking the value 0. Thus, they all exhibited primal degeneracy. It is well known 
that in such cases, the optimal values of the dual variables will be non-unique even when 
they are non-zero and cannot be interpreted as shadow prices (Ali 1994, Gal 1986)9. 
Thus, we cannot say anything about the opportunity cost of pollution abatement in the 
case of the 11 countries that showed no technical inefficiency. This is true even for 
countries like Algeria, Bangladesh, Oman, Mozambique, and Cameroon, all of which had 
strictly positive values of both of the dual variables. For the two countries that were 
inefficient but had zero shadow prices of CO2 emissions (Peru and Uruguay), the 
pollution constraint was non-binding at the optimal solution. This implies that they would 
be able to reduce pollution without sacrificing GDP up to the extent of the respective 
slacks in the constraint. For the remaining 99 countries, both shadow prices are positive 
                                                          
9
 A parametric specification (e.g. Färe et al. 2006) of the distance function could minimize, although not 
entirely eliminate, the incidence of zero shadow prices.   
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and the relative shadow price of CO2 does represent the (marginal) opportunity cost of 
pollution abatement. 
 It may be noted in this context, that Jeon and Sickles (2004) did explicitly 
recognize that the shadow prices were valid only for frontier observations and there could 
be significant adjustment cost of projecting an actual observation on to the frontier. In an 
attempt to circumvent this problem, they focused only on the shadow prices of the OECD 
countries in their sample, the bulk of which they found to be close to the frontier. By 
contrast, our approach allows us to measure and interpret the shadow price of CO2 
emission of countries without projecting them to the frontier.  
 A simple interpretation of the relative price of CO2 emission is that it represents 
the minimum reduction in GDP per capita necessary for lowering per capita emissions by 
1 metric ton. Alternatively, it shows the amount by which per capita GDP would have to 
rise to justify an increase in per capita emissions by 1 ton, unless the country can increase 
its efficiency. By this measure, a 1-ton decrease in CO2 emission in the U.S. would 
require a decrease in per capita GDP by $3140.04 where as a similar decline in pollution 
in India would require a sacrifice in per capita GDP of $7940.03. But this line of 
reasoning fails to consider the fact that a 1-ton change is less than a 5% change from the 
observed level of emission in the U.S. By contrast, it is a 100% change in the case of 
India. Instead of considering the same absolute amount of change in emissions across 
different countries, it would be more meaningful to consider the opportunity cost of the 
same percentage change from the observed levels of emission. In Table 3 we compare the 
opportunity costs (in the form of foregone GDP per capita) of a 1% reduction in CO2 
emission per capita for a sample of 12 countries. The column PC_CO2 reports the actual 
levels of emission per capita in the selected countries. The column (  CO2) shows the 
actual quantities of CO2 that constitute 1% of the respective observed emission levels. 
Note that 1% of actual emission per capita in the U.S. is 0.202 metric ton. In the case of 
China it is only 0.027 ton and for India it is even lower (0.01 ton). The final column 
(OC_GDP) shows the opportunity cost of a 1% reduction in CO2 emission expressed as 
the percentage of the actual per capita GDP in these countries. In the U.S, Brazil, China, 
and Korea a 1% decrease (increase) in emission per capita would be offset by about 1.8% 
decrease (increase) in per capita GDP. For Canada a 1% change in emission would 
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warrant a 4.5% change in GDP. For the Russian Federation a 1% decrease or increase in 
emission would be offset by a 4% change in GDP in the same direction. For Germany 
(1.18%), Japan (1.12%), Argentina (1.05%), and Mexico (1.36%) the opportunity cost in 
terms of GDP change is much lower. 
 It is sometimes argued that developed industrial nations like the U.S. would have 
to bear the bulk of the cost of pollution abatement because a 1% reduction from their 
existing levels of emission would imply a much larger absolute level of reduction. After 
all, CO2 pollution is a global phenomenon and a specific quantity of emission whether 
from the U.S. or from China would in the end have the same impact on the global 
environment. In Table 4 we evaluate the opportunity cost of the same target level of 
pollution abatement to different countries. Note that the countries differ in the levels of 
per capita emission as well as their population sizes. We selected a target level of 
reduction in total quantity of emission equal to 1% of the total emission level observed in 
the U.S. in 2000. A per capita CO2 emission level of 20.2 tons and a 2000 population size 
of 283 millions yields a total emission figure of 5,716.6 million metric tons in the U.S. in 
the year 2000. Hence, a 1% emission reduction implies a targeted level of reduction of 
57.166 million metric tons. The same absolute amount of reduction is a much lower per 
capita reduction in countries with large population sizes like China and India compared to 
countries like Canada or Argentina where the population size is much smaller. Because of 
differences in the population sizes, the same amount of 57.166 ton reduction in total CO2 
emission translates into a 1.844 ton reduction per capita in Canada but only a 0.0566 ton 
reduction per capita in India (see column (7)). The column ‘  CO2_%’ shows the implied 
reduction as percentage of the actual emissions. We use the country specific shadow 
relative price of CO2 reduction to figure out the implied opportunity cost of this reduction 
for each of the selected countries. The final column ‘OC_GDP’ shows the resulting 
decline in GDP per capita that would be needed to achieve this absolute reduction in total 
emission in the individual countries. As can be seen from the last column in Table 4, a 
1% decrease in per capita emission in the U.S. would require a 1.774% reduction in GDP 
per capita. But the same amount of emission reduction will cost 49.66% reduction in per 
capita GDP in Canada, 41.119% loss of GDP in South Africa, 3.075% loss in China, and 
16.779% reduction in per capita GDP in India. It is, therefore, difficult to argue that a 
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country like the U.S. would have to bear the bulk of the cost of global pollution 
abatement. 
 Because the environmental performance of a country is often evaluated in terms 
of pollution intensity of the output produced, it is worthwhile to examine the relative 
performance of countries once their actual output has been projected on to the efficient 
frontier. The last column of Table 2 provides the technical efficiency adjusted CO2 
intensity ( **2 yCO ). A country’s CO2 intensity depends on the composition of its GDP 
(which in turn often depends upon its stage of economic development), the available 
sources of energy in the form of fossil or non-fossil fuel, and its efficiency in utilizing its 
resources in producing the output with the least damage to the environment. A country 
which is low in CO2 intensity is often perceived to be environmentally efficient. A 
different picture of the relative performance often emerges when we examine the 
technical efficiency adjusted CO2 intensity. This measure shows the relative position of 
each country based on its core CO2 intensity i.e., performance that is purged of the effect 
of resource use inefficiency. In this context it is interesting to consider the case of the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine. In our sample these two countries are ranked 105th and 
107th respectively, in terms of CO2 intensity, whereas their ranks are 54th and 33rd 
respectively, in terms of technical efficiency adjusted emission intensity. This implies 
that the core emission intensities of these countries are not as high relative to other 
countries. It is primarily the resource utilization inefficiency that leads to such poor 
environmental performance of these countries. For our sample the rank correlation 
between the unadjusted and adjusted emission intensities was 0.5632 implying that in 
addition to core emission intensity, differences in technical inefficiency is an important 
determinant of the environmental performance across countries. 
 The main findings of this study can now be summarized as follows: 
• For most countries in our sample it would be possible to produce a higher level of 
GDP and a lower level of pollution from their input bundles if they can improve 
their technical efficiency. 
• Of the eleven countries found to be on the frontier of the production possibilities 
set, Ireland is the only country from the developed world that makes this list. 
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• There is considerable variation across countries in the opportunity cost of a 1% 
reduction in CO2 emission per capita. In the U.S., Brazil, China, and Korea a 1% 
decrease in emission per capita would entail about 1.8% decrease in per capita 
GDP whereas in case of Canada and the Russian Federation it would require a 
4.5% and 4% reduction in GDP.  
• Whereas a 1% decrease in CO2 in the U.S. would cost 1.8% of GDP per capita, 
the same absolute volume of CO2 reduction would have an opportunity cost of 
43% loss of GDP per capita in Argentina, nearly 50% in Canada, and 41% in 
South Africa. It is therefore, difficult to argue that the U.S. would have to bear a 
disproportionate share of the cost of pollution reduction. 
• A comparison of the actual and the technical efficiency adjusted emission 
intensities reveals the important role of variation in technical efficiency in 
explaining the relative environmental performance of a country. Selected poor 
performing countries like the Russian Federation and Ukraine would improve 
significantly in the ranking through better resource utilization. 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper uses DEA to measure technical efficiency of production where GDP 
and CO2 emissions are the good and the bad output, using the directional distance 
function as the analytical framework. We also derive the relative shadow price of the bad 
output, measuring the opportunity cost of a marginal reduction in CO2 emission in the 
form of a reduction in GDP per capita. One caveat is that many of the countries found to 
be technically efficient are found to be from the less developed parts of the world with 
low levels of industrialization. Because the extent of energy use is tied to the use of 
capital and therefore to the state of industrial efficiency, their measured level of 
efficiency might simply reflect the less developed state of their economy.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
GDP 
(per capita PPP 
int’l $ 2002) 
10420.19 9875.296664 
579 
Tanzania 
36596 
Norway 
CO2 
(metric tons per 
person 2000) 
4.891818 4.863652421 
0.1 
* 
26 
Kuwait 
fossil fuel 
(per capita kgoe 
2001) 
1712.492 1720.182095 
13.29 
Congo Dem Rep 
7088.79 
Singapore 
non fossil fuel 
(per capita kgoe 
2001) 
505.581 971.2016737 
0 
** 
8602.2 
Iceland 
* Congo Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania 
** Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia  
Source: World Resources, 2005.  
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Table 3: Opportunity cost of 1% pollution reduction for selected countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Country PC_CO2 PC_GDP   CO2 OC_GDP 
1 United States 20.2 35746 0.202 1.7744 
2 Canada 16.9 29484 0.169 4.5512 
3 Germany 10.2 27102 0.102 1.1818 
4 Russian Federation 10.6 8269 0.106 4.0252 
5 Japan 9.6 26937 0.096 1.1191 
6 Argentina 3.7 11083 0.037 1.0483 
7 Brazil 1.9 7752 0.019 1.9461 
8 China 2.7 4577 0.027 1.8523 
9 India 1 2681 0.01 2.9616 
10 Korea 10 17161 0.1 1.8298 
11 Mexico 3.9 8972 0.039 1.3649 
12 South Africa 7.8 10152 0.078 2.4126 
Note: For each country, column (3) and (4) report the per capita CO2 emission in metric tons (2000) and 
per capita GDP in PPP International $ (2002) respectively. Column (5) reports in metric tons the equivalent 
of a 1% reduction in per capita CO2 emission. Column (6) reports the opportunity cost of a 1% reduction in 
per capita CO2 emission in terms of forgone per capita GDP in %.  
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Table 4: Opportunity cost of a target pollution reduction amount for selected 
countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
No Country PC_CO2 Pop Total CO2 GDP 
Target 
  PC_CO2   CO2_% OC_GDP 
1 U.S. 20.2 283 5716.6 35746 0.202 1 1.77443 
2 Canada 16.9 31 523.9 29484 1.8440645 10.91162 49.66059 
3 Germany 10.2 82 836.4 27102 0.6971463 6.83477 8.07714 
4 Russian Fed. 10.6 145 1537 8269 0.3942483 3.71932 14.97104 
5 Japan 9.6 127 1219.2 26937 0.450126 4.68881 5.24711 
6 Argentina 3.7 37 136.9 11083 1.5450270 41.75749 43.77377 
7 Brazil 1.9 170 323 7752 0.3362706 17.69845 34.44271 
8 China 2.7 1275 3442.5 4577 0.0448361 1.6606 3.07597 
9 India 1 1009 1009 2681 0.0566561 5.66561 16.77923 
10 Korea 10 47 470 17161 1.2162979 12.16298 22.25525 
11 Mexico 3.9 99 386.1 8972 0.5774343 14.80601 20.20917 
12 South Africa 7.8 43 335.4 10152 1.3294419 17.04413 41.11998 
Notes: Column (3) reports the per capita CO2 emission in metric tons (2000). Column (4) and column (5) 
report the population in 2000 in millions and the total CO2 emission in millions metric tons (2000) 
respectively. Column (6) reports the per capita GDP in PPP International $ (2002). Column (7) shows a 
57.16 million metric tons reduction is equal to what per capita amount emission reduction for each of the 
other countries. Column (8) shows a 1% reduction in emissions in the U.S. (i.e., 57.16 million metric tons) 
is equal to what % per capita emission reduction for each of the other countries. Column (9) shows the 
opportunity cost in terms of % of per capita GDP that each country would have to forego in order to reduce 
emissions by 57.16 million metric tons.  
 
 
 
